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RumiDude
Marmota olympus
Joined: 26 Jul 2009
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RumiDude
Marmota olympus
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 Sat Jan 14, 2017 11:21 am |
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My favorite quote from this paper, which I have also linked to on this site before, is this one.
"Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment." — Barry LePatner
Rumi
"This is my Indian summer ... I'm far more dangerous now, because I don't care at all."
"This is my Indian summer ... I'm far more dangerous now, because I don't care at all."
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Jetlag
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Joined: 17 Aug 2010
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Jetlag
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Mon Jan 16, 2017 6:54 pm |
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Excellent discussion of the key factors! Great sharing of slightly different viewpoints.
The only thing I can add is that, as a frequent leader of group trips in potential avalanche terrain, it is sometimes REALLY hard to convince talented friends . . . and even people you don't know well . . . that they must stop right there and turn around. Or, as happened to me last spring, spend an unplanned cold night at high elevation when I deemed the depth of structure-less surface as being unsafe to descend.
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gb
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Joined: 01 Jul 2010
Posts: 6310 | TRs | Pics
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gb
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Tue Jan 17, 2017 9:17 am |
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| RumiDude wrote: | |
My favorite quote from this paper, which I have also linked to on this site before, is this one.
"Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment." — Barry LePatner
Rumi |
That was Joe Firey's favorite quote as well. Judgement, hopefully good, comes from experience. I think, too, that to a degree judgement also comes from the experience of others, for better or worse. For example, by reading about an avalanche accident (often the accident report as in the Crystal accident); we, to a degree, increase our knowledge in some cases beyond the bounds of our personal experience. That also happens when skiing with peers through communication. It makes us think about how we look at things (in this case avalanche related). A good example of this is that experienced skiers who ski in different snow climates (maritime, intermountain, and continental; perhaps also arctic) have different perceptions of what constitutes safe avalanche terrain, and in when to ski (or climb) certain terrain. Obviously, this can't come just from personal experience, or many of these folks would be dead to gain the experience. Rather, some of it has to come from education; formal, or through the experiences of others, and through communication within a peer group.
Of course, learning from the behavior of others can work the other way; as well. MacCammon's heuristic traps, referenced above, point this out. Negative outcomes can also come from the feedback we get, depending on how we interpret the feedback. The thing I am writing about is the negative feedback loop where we execute a particular behavior, choice, or strategy, and it works out fine; so we do it again. Though the odds of success are good with this methodology, they aren't perfect, either. A good example is the skiing of extremely steep terrain that probably came into play from the videos of people skiing extreme terrain in the Coast Range of Alaska. I haven't skied there, but friends have. Apparently most of the time (nearly all the time) in April and May the surface snow layers of the snowpack consolidate quickly (sinter) and the snowpack is free of persistent weak layers. When there are weak layers, they are known. Nonetheless, there have been high profile fatalities. We now routinely see the same type of behavior at Mt. Baker, for instance. But, in very steep terrain, it is not necessarily avalanche burial that will get you, but is likely to be trauma. Sooner or later....Note also that the huge avalanche that appeared to be a natural on Shuksan Arm in February of 1999 occurred on a slope that had been weakened, especially at it's base by skiers skiing and traversing. This was Mark Moore's conclusion.
I think that you would find, that over time, most backcountry skiers, snow control personnel, and guides will have been involved in an avalanche, or at the least have had some close calls that could have turned out differently provided that they often ski or travel in Complex or even Challenging terrain (as defined by the Avalanche Terrain Exposure Scale). The same is true for climbers in alpine terrain in winter or at high altitudes; although skiers have the most frequent exposure I would think. From my own personal experience, my early close calls were from lack of knowledge and my later close calls (in some of which I was not actually at risk because of good decisions but was still surprised by the outcome) were difficult situations involving persistent weak layers. From those experiences, and fairly early on, my conceptual model became one in which I only skied more exposed terrain (Complex, or even Challenging) when I felt I was sure of two things - one that there was no persistent weakness to the best of my knowledge - or that it was so shallowly buried, and secondly that the snowpack had had plenty of time to consolidate in cool temperatures and that there were apparently no significant weak layers in it's upper part and any slide would be shallow and confined to a small section of terrain. But even that methodology backfired in what was my most significant close call in 1998 when I was carried a very long distance by a significant slab in Complex alpine terrain. In reviewing that accident, I came to the not very difficult to reach conclusion that there was no way I could have anticipated that particular persistent weak layer (three weeks old) or have tested for it without triggering it. In conclusion, my risk profile was too high. That late winter I had skied a good deal at higher elevations in Complex terrain and had made many "good" decisions. I was rational in all of these decisions. But sooner or later...My take from this accident was that I needed to lower my risk profile.
A good friend of mine has been a highly performing climber on ice, and earlier in his career in the alpine for many years, and has relayed some of his significant close calls.
Both backcountry skiers and alpine/ice climbers face significant risks over time. The more often those risks are taken, the more likely it is that the wrong judgement will be made at some point in time or that there might just be bad luck (note the Atkins paper). I think snowshoers are in a different situation most of the time. It is possible and likely that snowshoers can stay safe over time likely by using rule based decision making. I think that because of two factors; first that snowshoers can have good outings while only encountering perhaps Challenging terrain, and second that the exposure in snowshoeing (not in climbing/scrambling) can be so infrequent that it would be difficult to gather the experience in evaluating snowpack in particular (and to some degree terrain, when considering micrometeorology).
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